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Information flows at OS level unmask sophisticated Android malware

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Abstract: The detection of new Android malware is far from being a relaxing job. Indeed, each day new Android malware appear in the market and it remains difficult to quickly identify them. Unfortunately users still pay the lack of real efficient tools able to detect zero day malware that have no known signature. The difficulty is that most of the existing approaches rely on static analysis coupled with the ability of malware to hide their malicious code. Thus, we believe that it should be easier to study what malware do instead of what they contain. In this article, we propose to unmask Android malware hidden among benign applications using the observed information flows at the OS level. For achieving such a goal, we introduce a simple characterization of all the accountable information flows of a standard benign application. With such a model for benign apps, we lead some experiments evidencing that malware present some deviations from the expected normal behavior. Experiments show that our model recognizes most of the 3206 tested benign applications and spots most of the tested sophisticated malware (ransomware, rootkits, bootkit).

1 INTRODUCTION

Once Android has become the most popular mobile platform, it has also become the mobile operating system most heavily targeted by malware. The main goal of these malware is to make money thanks to the user and unbeknownst to the user. In the same time, app store providers try to prevent malicious apps from entering official market or to remove them once entered. For that purpose, these providers can resort to automated security analysis or manual reviews of security experts. The automated approaches are mainly based on static program analysis that tries to statically detect if applications are responsible of sending messages to premium services, or exfiltrating personal private data.

In 2012, Zhou *et al.* claim that current marketplaces are functional and relatively healthy since they have discovered less than 0.5% of infection rate (Zhou *et al.*, 2012). We believe that this result has two different interpretations: either the tools used to keep the markets clean are very efficient, or malware are more clever and succeed to evade detection engines. A deeper study of this work reveals that existing tools are efficient to detect only simple malware that mainly

try to send text messages to premium phone numbers. Moreover, the range of more sophisticated malware is not included in the study of Zhou *et al.* For instance, they do not study ransomware, the malware that requests an amount of money from the user while promising to release a hijacked resource in exchange. In the same way, malware that erase user's data from the device and turn it into part of a hacker botnet, as done by the malware Mazar¹, are not included in the study. We believe that any malware will succeed to defeat classical program analysis by relying on obfuscation, dynamic code loading or ciphering. We claim here that trying to clean the market by resorting only to classical static program analysis is a lost cause.

In this paper, we propose a different approach that aims to explore first how a benign Android application and its created processes should interact with other elements of the operating system. The originality of this approach is that we do not care about the nature of the executed code but we focus on how applications disseminate information in the operating sys-

¹<https://heimdalsecurity.com/blog/security-alert-mazar-bot-active-attacks-android-malware/>

tem during one execution. More precisely, we study which operations a non-malicious application is able to perform: we translate these operations in terms of information flows between files, sockets and processes of the operating system. We explain each information flow and this way, we build a generic graph of all allowed information flows in the operating system due to the execution of an Android application. We put this generic graph to the proof: we executed more than 3206 applications attested as benign by anti-virus software used by Virustotal². We verify that these benign executions are conformed to the expected normal pattern.

Finally, we claim that an attack of a sophisticated malware induces behaviors that deviate from the legitimate one, from the operating system point of view. To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, we led experiments on nine sophisticated malware such as rootkits, bootkits, and ransomware extracted from the Kharon dataset (Kiss et al., 2016). We show that these experiments easily spot malware since they exhibit graphs out of the expected pattern.

In the rest of this article, after reviewing the state of the art in Section 2, we develop this idea and we introduce in Section 3 how an Android application interacts with the system environment. We represent all existing information flows between files, sockets and processes in the Android system generated by the executed application under review. We also show, using two examples, the difference between a benign application and a malware. Then, Section 4 introduces formally the characterization model of a normal application execution. Finally, Section 5 verifies the accuracy of the approach on a dataset of 3206 goodware and Section 6 evaluates the efficiency of the approach on a collection of malware.

2 STATE OF THE ART

To build reliable detection solutions, researchers have worked on collecting relevant features characterizing malware. Such features can be collected statically or dynamically. Most of the proposed frameworks use static analysis in order to build signature detection tools or to help dynamic analysis. Works that dynamically analyze applications use dynamic features to build HIDS or NIDS algorithms.

One of the first papers that worked on dynamic Android malware detection have been proposed by Schmidt *et al.* in 2008 (Schmidt et al., 2008). They implemented a live monitoring solution that collects

system observables such as filesystem access, network events or Java features of the application. This first proposal has been improved and exploited in AASandBox (Blasing et al., 2010), which provides a full environment for executing a malware and extracting both kernel events (such as syscalls) and Java events such as *Runtime.Exec()*. Advanced techniques characterizing calls at thread level give good classification results (Lin et al., 2013).

Researchers have investigated a wide set of possible features to extract (Wu et al., 2012; Shabtai et al., 2012; Afonso et al., 2014). In one of these first works (Shabtai et al., 2012), authors have proposed Andromaly, a framework that collects CPU and energy consumption, network statistics and the number of running processes. Then, a lot of classification algorithms have been investigated and compared with different parameters such as the setup of the training set of applications or the impact of the use of different devices. In 2014, Neuner *et al.* proposed a comparison of most known platforms (Neuner et al., 2014) in order to show the features used by dynamic analysis tools. All the proposals use very similar features. Many papers use tainting techniques (Enck et al., 2010), similarly to this paper, but they mainly use it to monitor access to private data.

Without a real user in charge of running applications manually, it is a challenge to execute correctly a malware and observe it. Recent approaches have proposed solutions to target the suspicious code and then to stimulate the executed malware. In (Zheng et al., 2012), a static analysis of the bytecode helps to trigger automatically the applications' UI. In (Abraham et al., 2015), authors proposed to modify the application control flow to reach the suspicious code. In (Wong and Lie, 2016), authors compute the set of inputs that trigger the suspicious code using static analysis. All these techniques help to automatize the execution of Android malware. Combined with tainting techniques, information flows generated from an execution can be obtained automatically for a collection of malware.

Compared to previous approaches, this paper is the first to use information flow graphs to build an Android malware detection technique. We believe that a simple formalism of legitimate information flows can easily spot sophisticated malware that would reveal their behavior at the OS level. In the next section, we describe more formally the graph representation of these flows before moving in Section 4 to the characterization of flows of a benign application.

²<https://www.virustotal.com>

3 OS INTERACTIONS OF APPS

On Android operating systems, third party applications can be downloaded from official and non official markets, or manually installed. All of them are installed on the device by deploying an archive with the extension `.apk`. The installation process first consists in decompressing this archive. Usually, it contains the compiled code of the application (`classes.dex`) and a file `AndroidManifest.xml` that describes the application (activities, permissions, ...). Lastly, an `.apk` archive also contains all resources (i.e. images, `.xml` config files, databases) needed by the application.

To build our detection methodology, we need to describe how an Android application contaminates the operating system during its execution. In particular, we do not care about the nature of the executed code but we are more interested to discover which files have been accessed, which processes were created, which IP addresses the application has contacted, and recursively how these *contaminated objects* have themselves influenced the operating system. For this purpose, we propose to capture all the information flows inside the operating system caused by the execution of an application. We represent these information flows on a particular graph called *System Flow Graph* (or SFG for short) (Andriatsimandefitra and Viet Triem Tong, 2014). Examples of SFG issued from malware observations and used latter in this paper can be found in the Kharon dataset (Kiss et al., 2016) available at `kharon.gforge.inria.fr/dataset`. Formally, a SFG is a pair $(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$ where \mathcal{V} is a set of vertices and \mathcal{E} is a set of edges. A vertex v in \mathcal{V} denotes objects that contain information in the operating system as files, sockets or processes. An edge between two vertices denotes an information flow from a source to a destination.

In practice, we construct these SFGs using AndroBlare, an information flow monitor at the operating system level combined with GroddDroid (Abraham et al., 2015), a framework to automatically execute applications and force suspicious code execution when needed. AndroBlare attaches a first mark to a particular content of an information container. Afterward, each time a marked object accesses a non marked one, the mark is propagated to the non marked object. The mark transits in the system through extended attributes of files and on processes. Each observed flow is logged and the whole log is transformed into a SFG. GroddDroid (Abraham et al., 2015) automatizes the execution of applications by stimulating the graphical interface and monitors the execution.

In the remainder of this paper, the presented graphs are computed from observing a single execu-

tion of an Android application where only one piece of information is initially marked: the APK file that has been downloaded on the device. Indeed, the archive is the original information that we want to monitor the dissemination.

Figure 1 gives an example of an SFG that results from monitoring an Android application. Files are represented by (gray) rounded boxes, processes are represented by (green) ellipses, and sockets are represented by (blue) stars. This application is a virtual piano installed from the initial node, the orange one whose name is `com.als.grandpiano.free.apk`. We have analyzed it on VirusTotal and none of the 54 anti-viruses have detected a malware in it. The graph tells us which files and processes are modified or influenced by the archive `com.als.grandpiano.free.apk`. In particular we can focus on the process named `grandpiano.free` that executes the application. The neighborhood of this node is the direct resources of the application. In our figure, we learn that the application uses database files (`.db`), sounds files (`.sf2`) and a compiled C library (`.so`). The graph also shows a particular process `system_server`, colored in yellow, which interacts with many other processes. `System_server` is a particular process used to deliver Android services to other applications. This process firstly verifies if the application has the right permission to access the requested service and secondly accesses the service.

In a benign application's graph, such as the virtual piano's one, interactions with the objects of the Android operating system can be explained: an application is allowed to create files to make persistent data and can request services through `system_server`. On the contrary, malware graphs present interactions that cannot be explained easily and correspond to abnormal behaviors. For example, the graph of the SimpleLocker malware (Kiss et al., 2016) (malware that encrypts the user's files and exacts a ransom from him), which is depicted in Figure 2, presents interesting variations. Similarly to the graph of virtual piano, the graph presents the same normal pattern: the original APK file in orange, the process executing the application that creates files in its neighborhood and the requests to services through `system_server`. Additionally, a precise observation shows that the application has created an encrypted version of all media files belonging to the users (`.enc` files). Nevertheless, we consider these interactions as normal because these file nodes are in the neighborhood of the `rg.simplelocker` process. We also observed a process named `Tor` and some interactions between it and remote IP addresses. `Tor` was not installed on the device before the execution of SimpleLocker which




Figure 1: System Flow Graph of virtual piano application

means that the application has installed it. This part of the graph has no explanation for a non malicious application: a normal one should not dialog with a remote server through Tor. We lead some extra research on this sample: these IP addresses were Tor relay nodes and the malware was anonymously communicating with the attacker in order to verify that the user has paid the ransom before deciphering his files.

The question explored in this article is thus the following: can we compute a set of characteristics over system flow graphs that allows to distinguish benign Android applications from malicious ones? Intuitively, the expected answer is *Yes, we can*. We will show in the following that benign applications always exhibit graphs where only expected and identified patterns appear, and malicious applications exhibit additional isolated patterns.

4 NORMAL BEHAVIORS

In this section, we formally define what is an expected normal behavior of an observed SFG graph. Such a "normal behavior" describes the expected interactions between the application and the operating system during its execution.

Since we focus on interactions between processes and sockets or files, we have to define the behavior of an Android application from this point of view. For that purpose we introduce the following terminology. An information *flow* from an object A towards an object B means that the content of B has been influenced

by the content of A . A flow from A to B is denoted by $A \rightarrow B$. Moreover, when we introduce the notation $A \rightarrow^1 B$ to denote that an information flow from A to B that is mandatory. In the same way the notation $A \rightarrow^0 B$ indicates that a flow from A to B may exist. Lastly, we write $X \rightarrow^{0..*} Y$ to denote that information flows from an object of type X towards an object of type Y may appear one or several times.

We also introduce a terminology for objects. As we install a malware using an `.apk` archive (its code and resources), this archive is the unique source of information that we want to monitor, we introduce the notation **Apk** for this file. Then, the particular object that corresponds to the process executing the code of the application is denoted **App**. Objects of the Android operating system are denoted by their system name (as `system_server`, `android.browser`, `media server`, ...). Lastly, **file** (resp. **process**, **socket**) is used to denote a variable object of type file (resp. process, socket).

Using this terminology, we are now able to formalize an application behavior in terms of information flows. To do this, we turn back to the Android permissions list. We translate each permission in terms of information flows involved in the operating system. For instance, to access the device camera, an application must declare the CAMERA permission in its manifest. To use it, the developer can use the `android.hardware.camera2` package that provides an interface to individual cameras connected to the Android device. The execution of this package's methods implies a verification of




Figure 2: System Flow Graph of the malware SimpleLocker




Figure 3: Generic pattern of a benign application

the permissions granted to the application and the effective camera access. This access is indeed relayed by the particular process `system_server`. Such an access will induced information flows `App` \rightarrow `system_server` \rightarrow `android.camera2` for the access and `android.camera2` \rightarrow `system_server` \rightarrow `App` due to the data sent by the camera. This short example illustrates how we have studied all possible operations of an application and how we have translated these operations in terms of information flows. Thus, we describe the expected behavior of an application in five main parts.

1) The process running the application is issued from the archive: in terms of information flow it simply means that any information flow on the form `Apk` \rightarrow `App` is accountable and mandatory. Otherwise, it means that running the application has failed.

2) Interactions with own resources: each application is allowed to make some computation by itself and to use the resources contained in its own archive. In terms of information flow it means that the process running the application (the `App` object) can be a destination of flows: `file` \rightarrow `App`. Dually to these operations, the process running the application can be a source of flows towards its own external resources (such as configuration, sound and scores files). In terms of information flows, it means that flows of the

form `App` \rightarrow `file` are allowed and accountable. All these flows are allowed but not mandatory.

3) Requests to Android services: information flows between `system_server` and `App` are considered normal. As `system_server` delegates service requests to other processes (for example for audio, contacts, etc.), any flow that comes out from `system_server` is thus legitimate. It means that information flows of the form `App` \rightarrow `system_server` \rightarrow `file` and `App` \rightarrow `system_server` \rightarrow `process` \rightarrow `file` are allowed and accountable: these flows happen because of a service request. The reciprocal flows `file` \rightarrow `system_server` \rightarrow `App` and `file` \rightarrow `process` \rightarrow `system_server` \rightarrow `App` are allowed and accountable. Flows of these forms are allowed but not mandatory.

4) Internet or network connection: Android applications are allowed to request access to remote servers if they have the right permission. They can also delegate this access to the web browser. This induce flows of the form `App` \rightarrow `socket`, `App` \rightarrow `android.browser` \rightarrow `socket`.

5) Dynamic code loading: an Android application can use a class loader that loads classes from `.jar` and `.apk` files. To do so, the process `dexopt` optimizes the archive and deploys the

dex output in writable directories. This dynamic code loading is represented by the following flows: **App** $\rightarrow^{0...*}$ **file** $\rightarrow^{0...*}$ **dexopt** and **file** $\rightarrow^{0...*}$ **dexopt** $\rightarrow^{0...*}$ **App**. These flows are allowed, accountable but not mandatory. For example, on the left side of Figure 1, we can observe that the application has created a java archive `ads-216290356.jar` then translated in `ads-216290356.dex` by `dexopt`.

Table 1 sums up this study by giving a generic expression of all allowed and accountable flows of an Android application. In the same way, Figure 3 gives a representation of a generic benign SFG. We claim here that any information flow appearing in the SFG of a benign application should be in one of the categories listed above. Other information flows have no explanation and are symptoms of malicious activities.

5 GOODWARE EXPERIMENTS

This section aims to verify that the previous generic representation succeeds effectively to capture normal behaviors. For that purpose we lead experiments on a collection of 3206 Android applications from the Google Play store.

First, we submitted our 3206 applications to VirusTotal to confirm that none of them are malware or even suspicious. Then, we automatically execute these applications on a real smartphone using GrodDroid (Abraham et al., 2015). More precisely, GrodDroid triggers elements of the user interface, like button and combo box, and discovers the different activities. Before every application’s analysis we restore a clean image of the device. Each execution is monitored and represented by one system flow graph. This part of the experiments has required more than 11 days of computation and generated 3206 graphs.

For each of these graphs, we lead the following experiments: for each edge from A to B in the application’s graph, if $A \rightarrow B$ does not match any generic edge in the generic form of a normal behavior then this edge is considered out of the normal behavior. We claim that if our generic form of a normal behavior is complete then we would have almost no edges out of the normal behavior. We obtained that 95% of these goodware have less than one edge out of the expected normal behavior (95th percentile value) which represented less than 0.2 percent of edges in their initial graph. We have also observed extreme values where 46 nodes and 76 edges are out of the expected behavior. A manual review of this extreme case reveals that the graph was ill-formed because of an error in the monitoring. Table 2 details all these results.

6 CAN MALWARE MIMIC BENIGN APPS?

Before concluding, we study the efficiency of our approach to detect sophisticated malware.

As stated before we do not care about simple malware that earn money by calling or sending text messages to premium numbers. Moreover, malware that simply send text messages or call premium numbers exhibit a normal behavior for this approach: they ask for a service for which they have requested the permission. Thus, we focus on more sophisticated malware i.e. those that need to exploit a vulnerability on the phone, make themselves persistent, ransom the user or obey to a remote server. We claim that these malware have a behavior that differs from the previous normal behavior. To evaluate this idea we led experiments on a dataset (Kiss et al., 2016) containing a ransomware (Simplelocker), an aggressive adware (MobiDash), two spyware (Cajino and SaveMe), a rootkit (Mazar), a data eraser (WipeLocker), a bootkit (PoisonCake) and lastly two malware that install undesired applications (Badnews and DroidKungFu).

We applied exactly the same algorithm to check if there exists a part of a malware graph out of the expected normal behavior. Then we reviewed all the remaining sub-graphs to verify if they reveal a malicious symptom. These results, detailed in Table 4, show that this method allows to point out sophisticated malware as ransomware, rootkit or data eraser. Indeed, these malware deviate from the normal expected behavior once they gain administrator privileges, or install an application unbeknownst to the user. For example, Figure 4 shows the part of the graph out of the expected normal behavior for the Mazar malware. The most interesting thing in this remaining graph is that it exhibits a connection to a remote server through the anonymous network Tor (IP addresses are anonymized). Additionally, we report in Table 4 that we partially capture a behavior if we can only observed that the malware has gained administrator privileges.

On the other side, this approach fails to spot aggressive Adware (MobiDash) because displaying ads can be considered as a normal behavior. Nevertheless the graph of MobiDash has a huge amount of remote connections in the graph even if each of them is part of the expected behavior. Thus, we plan to enhance our approach by taking into account the maximal number of remote IP an application is authorized to contact.

We then tested this approach on 102 random malware whose behavior is less documented, extracted from the website <http://koodous.com>. The results are summarized in Table 3. This experiment confirms

Table 1: Allowed and accountable information flows

GENERIC EXPRESSION OF ALLOWED INFORMATION FLOWS	Mandatory
Application installation	
Apk → App	yes
Interaction with own resources	
file → ^{0...*} App	no
App → ^{0...*} files	no
Services requests	
App → system_server → ^{0...*} file	no
file → ^{0...*} process → ^{0...*} system_server → App	no
Services responses	
file → system_server → ^{0...*} App	no
App → system_server → ^{0...*} process → ^{0...*} file	no
Remote connections	
App → ^{0...*} socket	no
App → ^{0...*} android.browser → ^{0...*} socket	no
Package installation	
App → ^{0...*} file → ^{0...*} dexopt	no
file → ^{0...*} dexopt → ^{0...*} App	no

that malware have behaviors that differ from the expected normal behavior. More precisely, 95% of these malware have more than 407 edges out of the generic pattern described in Figure 3. Only one malware (1%) has a graph very close to this normal behavior, with 1 node and 0 edge in its final graph out of the expected normal behavior.

All the material that was used for the experiments described above are available on <http://kharon.gforge.inria.fr/goodware.html>.

7 CONCLUSION

In this paper, we tackled the challenge of precisely defining the normal behavior of Android applications at the operating system level. To this end, we proposed the idea of defining this normal behavior through information flows between files, processes and sockets observed during the execution of an application. This way, we introduced the first model of a normal behavior at system level for an Android application. To verify if this model is complete enough to

Table 2: Experiments on goodware behaviors

	MIN	AVG	90TH %ILE	95th %ile	MAX
INITIAL SFG OF AN ANDROID APPLICATION					
NB of nodes in the initial SFG	17	106	123	127	538
NB of edges in the initial SFG	75	251	288	298	661
SUB-SFG NOT INCLUDED IN THE EXPECTED BEHAVIOR					
NB of nodes out the expected normal behavior	0	1	2	2	46
NB of edges out the expected normal behavior	0	0.4	0	0.2	76

Table 3: Experiments on malware behaviors

	MIN	AVG	90TH %ILE	95th %ile	MAX
INITIAL SFG OF AN ANDROID APPLICATION					
NB of nodes in the initial SFG	68	172	352	373	387
NB of edges in the initial SFG	93	240	489	512	539
SUB-SFG NOT INCLUDED IN THE EXPECTED BEHAVIOR					
NB of nodes out the expected normal behavior	1	69	223	239	263
NB of edges out the expected normal behavior	0	123	351	407	498




Figure 4: Mazar's graph out of the normal behavior

capture the real behavior of benign Android applications we compared it with a large corpus of executions obtained from benign applications. In a second part, we led experiments on malicious applications and showed that this approach easily spot sophisticated malware such as ransomware, rootkits, data erasers, app installers or random chosen malware.

Table 4: Experiments on malware from the Kharon dataset (Kiss et al., 2016)

	Nodes in the SFG	Edges in the SFG	Nodes out of the expected normal behavior	Edges out of the expected normal behavior	Length of the maximal path	Detection result	Nature of the attack
MobiDash	421	689	0	0	0	no	Adware
SimpleLocker	61	73	19	27	2	yes	Ransomware
Badnews	120	200	18	15	1	yes	App installer
WipeLocker	73	168	15	14	2	partially	DataEraser
DroidKungFu	96	167	20	26	4	yes	App installer
Cajino	82	182	22	9	2	yes	Spyware
SaveMe	28	58	6	8	3	yes	Spyware
Mazar	62	111	22	36	2	yes	Rootkit
Poison Cake	320	543	17	16	3	yes	Bootkit

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